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SECRET EVIDENCE IS SLOWLY ERODING THE
ADVERSARY SYSTEM: CIPA AND FISA IN THE
COURTS
Ellen Yaroshefsky*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Bush administration is reportedly the most secretive in United
States history.1 The unprecedented scope of secrecy in intelligence
gathering, detentions, decision-making, data collection, and legislative
implementation has recently received public scrutiny.2 Often justified as
* Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the Jacob Bums Ethics Center at the Benjamin
N. Cardozo School of Law. I thank Roy Simon for his tireless work in organizing this symposium
honoring the work of Monroe Freedman whose leadership and commitment to justice continues to
be an inspiration. I am grateful to the many defense lawyers and federal prosecutors who generously
indulged my questions and provided valuable insights, especially Joshua Dratel, Nancy Hollander,
John Klein and Andrew G. Patel. I thank Peter Margulies for his comments on an earlier draft of
this Article. I appreciate the research assistance of Kim Grant and Alice Jayne.
1. David E. Sanger, The Washington Secret Often Isn 't, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2005, § 4 at I
(recognizing the Bush administration as "the most secretive White House in modem history"). This
article was written months before the revelation that the executive branch authorized a secret
surveillance without securing warrants pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
("FISA"). Eric Lichtblau and David E. Sanger, Administration Cites War Vote in Spying Case, NY
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2005, at 1. This program, whose legality is questionable, necessarily has a
significant impact on this article.
2. See Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 920 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(upholding government's refusal to make public the information about detention of more than 1000
undocumented aliens after 9/11); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil
Libertarianismand Executive Unilateralism:An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During
Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 1 (2004); Peter Margulies, Above Contempt?: Regulating
Government Overreaching in Terrorism Cases, 34 Sw. U. L. REV. 449 (2005); Eric Lichtblau, FBI
WatchedActivist Groups,New Files Show, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2005, at Al (reporting intelligence
gathering against domestic political organizations); Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in
Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at Al (reporting detentions in secret prisons); James
Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets US. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005,
at Al (revealing that the National Security Agency had been monitoring international telephone
calls and e-mail messages without warrants for the previous three years); CTR.
ON LAW AND SECURITY, TERRORIST TRIALS: A REPORT CARD 2 (Feb. 2005), available at
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essential to preserve national security, enhanced secrecy is a steady
evisceration of the transparency and accountability essential to a
functioning democracy.
While of a different dimension, concerns about transparency and
accountability exist within the judicial system by the government's use
of secret evidence in federal criminal prosecutions-that is, information
of potential evidentiary value not shared with the defendant, and often
not shared with defense counsel.3 Secret evidence raises critical issues
for our adversary system, including the protection of fundamental
constitutional rights and the balancing of the historical roles of the
prosecutor, defense lawyer, and court. Its use raises significant issues as
to whether defense counsel can fulfill her ethical responsibility as a
diligent, competent, zealous advocate for her client.4
I argue that such secret evidence, which has and will continue to
seep slowly into a wide range of federal criminal prosecutions,
undermines the ability of defense counsel to perform her essential role
and, in so doing, shifts the balance in an untenable fashion within our
adversary system. I make modest suggestions to maintain the proper
functioning of the adversary system in cases where secret evidence is
implicated.
http://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/awsecurity/publications/terroristtrialreportcard.pdf
[hereinafter
TERRORIST TRIALS] (recommending transparency in data collection for terrorism-related cases).
3. Secret evidence is defined elsewhere as "evidence-whether classified or unclassifiedthat is not disclosed to the accused himself." Note, Secret Evidence in the War on Terror, 118
HARV. L. REV. 1962 n.7 (2005). There are many other aspects of secrecy in the judicial system that
are beyond the scope of this Article. United States v. Ochoa-Vasquez, 428 F.3d 1015, 1029-30 (11 th
Cir. 2005) (reaffirming that secret dockets are unconstitutional); United States v. Abuhamra, 389
F.3d 309, 314 (2d Cir. 2004) (rejecting reliance on secret evidence to deny bail); Detroit Free Press
v. Ashcroft, 195 F. SupP.2d 937, 940 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (holding that secret immigration
proceedings that are closed to the public violate the First Amendment); David Cole, Enemy Aliens,
54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 953-54 (2002) (discussing massive secret preventive detention); see also
sources cited supranote 2.
4. In this Article, I focus upon the most significant ethical concerns for defense counsel in
cases involving secret evidence. Its use raises ethical issues beyond the scope of this Article
including an array of complex issues for prosecutors who face significant problems in carrying out
their discovery obligations. There are a myriad of agencies who classify information in the name of
intelligence gathering, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Central
Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The distrust between and among
agencies, the inability of the prosecutors to obtain access to all of the information and, in
circumstances where there is access, disagreements about whether the information should be
declassified, all give rise to ethical and tactical dilemmas for prosecutors. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, A
Critical Review of the Classified Information Procedures Act, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 277, 280-81
(1986) (discussing friction between the Justice Department ("DOJ") and intelligence agencies);
Mark D. Villaverde, Note, Structuring the Prosecutor'sDuty to Search the Intelligence Community
for Brady Material, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1471, 1475 (2003) (describing the dilemma faced by

prosecutors due to the disclosure threat posed by criminal prosecutions).
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II.

SECRET EVIDENCE

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PROCEDURES ACT AND FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT IN THE COURTS

Secret evidence, not new to this administration, exists throughout
tribunals in our legal system, whether in an immigration context, in
combatant status review tribunals, or in military courts.5
In a series of immigration cases in the late 1990s, the Clinton
Administration utilized secret evidence-information not made available
to the defense lawyer or the detainee-in seeking deportation or
exclusion from the United States.6 In one noted case, Kiareldeen v.
Reno, a thirty-three year-old Palestinian was detained in an immigration
proceeding for nineteen months based on evidence that consisted
exclusively of hearsay allegations. The government claimed that he was
"a threat to the national security," and that he was a member of a
terrorist organization. At no point during his detention was he provided
even the sketchiest details of the alleged threats or of the associations
and relationships he supposedly had with terrorist organizations. At his
immigration hearing, where he addressed these vague allegations as best
he could without seeing any evidence, he testified that the likely source
was his wife, with whom he was in a custody dispute. 9 In the past, she
repeatedly had made false allegations of domestic violence and terrorist
ties.' 0 The trial court ruled in his favor, saying he had rebutted the
charges and released him on bond." On appeal, the court ruled that the
reliance on secret evidence violated his due process rights because (1) it
deprived him of meaningful notice and an opportunity to confront the
evidence against him, and (2) exclusively hearsay evidence could not be

5. The overriding issue of secrecy and assertions of executive power-for example, the
extent to which executive decision-making is subject to judicial review-will continue to be the
subject of litigation. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535-36 (2004) (rejecting the
government's claim that the detention of enemy combatants is not subject to judicial review); Rasul
v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004) (granting federal habeas jurisdiction to hear petitions of detainees
at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba); James B. Anderson, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld: JudiciousBalancing at the
Intersectionof the Executive's Power to Detain and the Citizen-Detainee'sRight to Due Process, 95
J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 689, 689-90 (2005); Adam Liptak, In Terror Cases, Administration
Sets Own Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2005, at Al.
6. See, e.g., Najjar v. Reno, 97 F. SupP.2d 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2000); Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F.
SupP.2d 402 (D. N.J. 1999).
7. See Kiareldeen, 71 F. SupP.2d at 404.
8. Id.
9. See id. at 416.
10. Seeid. at417.
11. See id. at 418.
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tested for reliability. 12 This was the third case in an immigration context
13
holding that secret evidence is unconstitutional.
In federal criminal cases, where fundamental Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights are at the core of our constitutionalized adversary
system, there is greater scrutiny than in immigration cases. Nevertheless,
the use of secret evidence is distorting the adversary system.
A.

Fundamentalsof the Adversary System

In Article III courts, we presume that the defendant, through his
counsel, has access to incriminating and exculpatory facts, has the
opportunity to thoroughly investigate the case, to cross examine
witnesses and, if he chooses, to testify on his own behalf and to present
witnesses. 14 We expect and require the lawyer to mount a zealous
defense. 15 These fundamental ethical mandates for counsel are called
into question in a growing number of criminal prosecutions, notably
those that result from the work of intelligence agencies or other
government agencies that classify information.' 6 In such cases, because
information that is material and relevant is not readily available to the
defense, the defendant is placed at a significant disadvantage in case
investigation, preparation, and presentation.
12. See id.
13. See id; Susan M. Akram & Maritza Karmely, Immigration and Constitutional
Consequences of Post-9/JI PoliciesInvolving Arabs and Muslims in the UnitedStates: Is Alienage
a Distinction Without a Difference?, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 609, 614-16 (2005); see also Rafeedie
v. INS, 880 F.2d 506, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting that "how much process is due involves a
consideration of the government's interests in dispensing with procedural safeguards").
14. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS (3d ed.
2004). Discovery in federal criminal cases is limited. See generally Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(c)
(2000); FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(2); Discovery, 34 GEO. L. J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 316 (2005).
15. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 14, at 82-84 (noting that the ethical duty of zealous
advocacy is contained in the New York Code of Professional Responsibility but has been excised in
the ethical rules of nearly all of the jurisdictions by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct which
instead impose a duty to be diligent and competent); Roger C. Cramton, Furthering Justice By
Improving the Adversary System and Making Lawyers More Accountable, 70 FORDHAM L. REV.
1599, 1601-02 (2002) (noting that zealous advocacy, while excised from the Model Rules, is
considered by many lawyers to be their most sacred duty); Anita Bernstein, Remarks at the
Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System Legal Ethics Conference (Nov. 1, 2005).
16. Civil cases present similar issues. See ACLU v. Dep't of Def., 339 F. SupP.2d 501, 505
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (requiring the disclosure of previously unreleased documents after the
government's repeated failure to respond to or claim an exemption from a request by plaintiff under
the Freedom of Information Act); Doe v. Dep't of Justice, 790 F. Supp. 17, 18 (D.D.C. 1992)
(reviewing the government's attempt to avoid disclosure of classified documents about its treatment
of detainees in a Freedom of Information Act suit); see also Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. Dep't of
Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 920 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (concerning the release of information on persons
detained in the wake of 9/l1 by the government under the Freedom of Information Act).
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This is primarily the result of two statutes, the Classified
Information Procedures Act ("CIPA") which governs the disclosure of
classified information, 7 and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
("FISA"), which addresses procedures18 for surveillance techniques to
gather foreign intelligence information.
B. ClassifiedInfornationProceduresAct
CIPA was enacted to protect against "gray-mailing" or threats by
government officials or intelligence operatives such as Oliver North,
Wen Ho Lee, and John Poindexter, who were in a position to threaten to
release confidential government information unless the charges against
them were dismissed. 19 The statute provided a mechanism for these
defendants to utilize requested materials in their defense under a number
of conditions-notably that carefully delineated information was subject
to a protective order preventing its release. 20 In these typically "insider"
cases, the defendant previously had access to the classified information
and the offense was for work-related conduct. In such cases, the
government typically produces all the classified information to security-

17. See 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16 (1982). Classified information is "any information or material
that has been determined by the United States Government pursuant to an executive order, statute,
or regulation, to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national
security ... " Id. § 1(a); see also Ralph V. Seep, Annotation, Validity and Construction of
ClassifiedInformationProceduresAct (18 USCSAppx §§ 1-16), 103 A.L.R. Fed. 219 (1991).
18. See 50 U.S.C. § 1862(a) (2000). Secret evidence also includes the state secrets privilege,
invoked primarily in civil cases. It has been criticized as leading to abuses. Due to its expanded use,
the state secrets privilege "could bring court cases challenging the government's anti-terrorism
policies to a screeching halt." Morning Edition: A Look at State Secret Privileges (NPR radio
broadcast Sept. 9, 2005); see also United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1952) (discussing state
secrets privilege used to cover up military errors); Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d
544 (2d Cir. 1991) (upholding dismissal of wrongful death claim against missile defense systems
manufacturers, designers and testers); Edmonds v. Dep't of Justice, 323 F. SupP.2d 65 (D.D.C.
2004), cert denied, 2005 WL 3144129 (Nov. 28, 2005) (dismissing the case of the FBI
whistleblower); Christopher Brancart, Rethinking the State Secrets Privilege, 9 WHITTIER L. REV. 1,
2 (1987); Cass R. Sunstein, National Security, Liberty, and the D.C. Circuit, 73 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 693, 699-700 (2005).
Secret evidence also encompasses exceptions under the Freedom of Information Act
("FOIA") where the "disclosure of the existence of records could reasonably be expected to
interfere with enforcement proceedings," and the subject is unaware of its pendency. 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(c)(1)(B) (2000); see also Winterstein v. Dep't of Justice, 89 F. SupP.2d 79, 83 (D.D.C. 2000)
(denying FOIA request where it related to ongoing investigation); Peter Margulies, Uncertain
Arrivals: Immigration, Terror, and Democracy after September 11, 2002 UTAH L. REv. 481, 501
n. 102 (2002) (discussing the mosaic theory).
19. See United States v. North, 708 F. Supp. 399 (D.D.C. 1988); United States v. Lee, 90 F
SupP.2d 1324 (D.N.M. 2000); United States v. Poindexter, 698 F. Supp. 316 (D.D.C. 1988).
20. See CIPA, 18 U.S.C. app. § 5 (2000).
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cleared defense counsel and the defendant, who himself has security
clearance for access to the classified documents, reviews the evidence
with his lawyer. Consequently, CIPA works relatively effectively at the
discovery stage to afford the defendant basic Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights, while preserving the government's national security
concerns.21
CIPA's purpose is distorted, however, by its use in what is termed
"outsider cases," notably terrorism-related, international drug
conspiracies, international defense contractor cases and others
implicating foreign relations where the defendant never had and never
will have access to the material.22 In this expanding category of cases
there is no possibility of "gray-mailing"; the defendant cannot
reveal
23
classified information other than that provided in discovery.
CIPA sets forth detailed procedures for "matters relating to
classified information that may arise in connection with the
prosecution. 2 4 Where the government possesses classified, potentially
relevant information, section 4 of CIPA permits it to present such
information ex parte, in camera to the trial court for a determination as
to whether the documents are discoverable. The court, while not required
to do so, typically makes such a determination without the benefit of
input from the defense counsel.25 If deemed material and relevant, the
court either balances the need for the information against the claim of
21. In such cases, the controversy between defense counsel and the government is at the
second stage-the determination of admissibility of evidence at trial.
22. There is a third category of what can be deemed "quasi insider" cases where the defendant
is a government insider but is indicted for activities outside the scope of his duties and does not
have access to classified information related to the charges against him. This includes, for instance,
the highly publicized cases against Brian Regan, Aldrich Ames, and Robert Hanssen. See generally
FBI Digs Up Secret Documents in Spy Case, CNN, July 28, 2003, at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/07/28/regan.search (reporting Regan's offer to sell secrets to Iraq,
China, and Libya); On this Day: CIA Double Agent Jailed For Life, BBC NEWS, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/low/dates/stories/apriV28/newsid-2501000/2501007.stm
(last
visited Apr. 4, 2006) (reporting the story of CIA agent Aldrich Ames); Monica Davey, Secret
Passage,
CHI.
TRIB.
MAG.,
Apr.
21,
2002,
available
at
http://www.
cicentre.com/Documents/DOCHanssenTribunemag.htm (describing the story of Robert Hanssen).
I am indebted to attorney John Klein, who has served as counsel for Oliver North, Wen Ho Lee, and
J.l. Smith, for this typology.
23. CIPA provides for classification of information determined to require protection for
reasons of national security. National security is defined as "national defense and foreign relations."
18 U.S.C. app. § 1(b). This broad definition encompasses a wide range of crimes. See infra notes
96-97.
24. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2.
25. See id.§ 4 ("The court... may authorize the United States to delete specified items of
classified information. . ., to substitute a summary. . ., or to substitute a statement admitting

relevant facts ...in the form of a written statement to be inspected by the court alone.").
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government privilege or imposes a heightened standard of relevance to
determine whether the information is discoverable.26 Once the court
decides the classified information should be disclosed to defense
counsel, it can either: (1) order disclosure of the classified information or
(2) permit the government to submit a summary of the information or a
statement admitting relevant facts that the classified information would
tend to prove if such a substitute would provide the defendant with
substantially the same ability to make his defense as would the
disclosure.2 7 If the government chooses not to disclose the information,
the court can impose sanctions such as dismissal of a count or claim.28
The court cannot order the government to declassify the information or
require that it be turned over to the defense. 29 The government may also
26. CIPA concerns both discovery of classified information and its admissibility at trial.
There is abundant case law that the classified nature of the evidence should not affect the
determination of its disclosure and admissibility, thus the traditional materiality and relevance
discovery standard (FED. R. EVID. 401) should be applicable. See United States v. BaptistaRodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1363 (11 th Cir. 1994) ("CIPA does not create new law governing the
admissibility of evidence."); United States v. Wilson, 732 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating that
"CIPA does not 'undertake to create new substantive law governing admissibility' of evidence);
United States v. Clegg, 740 F.2d 16, 18 (9th Cir. 1984) (granting discovery because the classified
materials submitted in camera "are relevant to the development of a possible defense"); United
States v. Pickard, 236 F. SupP.2d 1204, 1209 (D. Kan. 2002) (stating that CIPA creates no "new
right of or limits on discovery"). Despite such case law, courts have imposed either a heightened
standard of relevance or a balancing test of relevance versus national security to decide whether
information is discoverable. See United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stating
that protection of government's classified information requires a higher threshold of materiality for
disclosure); United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 1988) (allowing balancing for
both discovery and admissibility); United States v. Pringle, 751 F.2d 419, 427 (1st Cir. 1984)
(stating that CIPA requires a balancing test for discovery); see also Seep, supra note 17, at 234
(stating that courts have used a balancing test in determining whether discovery is proper).
As to standards for evaluating admissibility of evidence, circuit courts differ as to whether a
balancing test is applicable. See United States v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding
that a balancing test should be used, but one that does not "override the defendant's right to fair
trial"); United States v. Anderson, 872 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Juan, 776 F.2d
256, 258 (11 th Cir. 1985) (using no balancing test for determining admissibility); United States v.
Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1107 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating that the court is required to use a balancing test
for admissibility).
27. See CIPA, 18 U.S.C. app. § 6(c).
28. Pursuant to a section 4 application, the government can request that items of classified
information from the disclosed documents remain classified. See id. § 4; see also United States v.
Moussaoui, 336 F.3d 279, 285 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating that "'disclose or dismiss'-was just what
Congress sought to eradicate by enacting CIPA").
29. The Lourt may "encourage" the government to de-classify the information and provide it
to defense counsel, but it has no authority to order the government to do so. Classification is an
executive, not judicial, function, and the fact of classification cannot be challenged under CIPA.
United States v. Collins, 720 F.2d 1195, 1198 n.2 (11 th Cir. 1983) ("It is an Executive function to
classify information, not a judicial one."); United States v. Smith, 750 F.2d 1215, 1217 (4th Cir.
1984) (stating that the classification cannot be challenged by defendant or the court), rev'd on other
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request in a section 4 application deletion of items of classified
information from the documents to be disclosed.3 °
Only a lawyer who has received a security clearance from the
government is entitled to review the classified material. 3' The lengthy
procedure to obtain such security clearance permits defense lawyers to
review documents classified at all levels-top secret, secret, or
confidential.3 2 Counsel's review of such documents is subject to a
protective order that precludes any release of the information-including
to the defendant.
C. FundamentalEthical Conflicts for Diligent, Competent, Zealous

Defense Counsel
Despite the fact that courts uniformly have upheld the
constitutionality of CIPA against claims that its provisions violate the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments,34 profound ethical dilemmas exist for

grounds, 780 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1985) (en bane) Defendants may challenge whether material is
properly classified. Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 17, 1995). Merely because
the government claims that information is classified does not mean that it is. While courts may be
skeptical about the classification of some documents, the very fact of classification typically results
in at least a heightened standard of relevance before a court deems a document discoverable. United
States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (discussing the higher threshold of
materiality where government asserts a privilege). However subtle, the executive branch wields
control of the scope of disclosure through its power to decide what information is classified. See
Tamanaha, supra note 4, at 300, 3 13-14.
30. Other sections of CIPA authorize pretrial conferences and adversarial hearings where the
defendant reasonably expects to disclose classified evidence. See CIPA, 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 5-6. In
such a case, the government may request a hearing to make determinations as to admissibility of
classified evidence. In these proceedings, the court has the options of substitution, redaction,
summarized information, or sanctions should the government choose not to disclose the classified
material. Pringle, 751 F.2d at 427; see infra notes 42, 92 for government use of section 4 ex parte
proceedings to avoid adversary proceedings.
31. See United States v. Bin Laden, 58 F. SupP.2d 113, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
32. Exec. Order No. 12,958, 3 C.F.R. 333, 335-36 (1996), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 435
(2000); Bin Laden, 58 F. SupP.2d at 118 (finding that court has authority to compel counsel to
undergo DOJ-initiated security clearance procedures).
33. CIPA, 18 U.S.C. app. § 3. But see United States v. Ressam, 221 F. SupP.2d 1252, 126465 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (holding that the First Amendment right of access attaches to protective
orders and discovery plays a significant role in the judicial process and the open administration of
justice).
34. Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1094; United States v. Wilson, 750 F.2d 7, 9 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding
"no constitutional infirmity" in section 5 requirements); United States v. Porter, 701 F.2d 1158,
1162-63 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that section 4 is not violative of the Fifth or Sixth Amendments);
United States v. Wilson, 721 F.2d 967, 976 (4th Cir. 1983); United States v. Lee, 90 F. SupP.2d
1324, 1329 (D.N.M. 2000) (finding that CIPA is not violative of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments);
United States v. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. 13, 32-33 (D.D.C. 1989); United States v. North, 708 F.
Supp. 399 (D.D.C. 1988) (holding that section 5 pretrial notification is constitutional); United States
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defense counsel. The most significant one arises because defense
counsel is typically excluded from the court's initial review of classified
material to determine whether information is discoverable.35 While in a
number of reported cases defense lawyers made requests to attend such
sessions, these were denied.36 Without access to the documents, counsel
cannot effectively argue for their disclosure. Despite a judicial view that
this "apparent Catch-22 is more apparent than real, 3 7 defense lawyers,
who have a significantly different role and perspective than the
prosecutor or court, believe that their ethical responsibilities are
compromised and their client's right to effective assistance of counsel is
jeopardized.3 8 How, at such an early stage, can we be assured that a
court can make an informed decision ex parte about the materiality and
relevance of information to a defense that is still in the early stages of
development?
By role definition, the court and the government do not share the
defense's perspective as to what evidence might be material or relevant.
Prosecutors are not in the best position to evaluate whether certain
classified documents are relevant and material to a defense theory of
which they may be unaware. 39 Even though the court is in a more neutral
v. Jolliff, 548 F. Supp. 229, 231 (D. Md. 1981) (limiting defendant's discovery rights following an
exparte, in camera proceeding is not a Sixth Amendment violation); see also Seep, supra note 17.
35. Ex parte proceedings have been approved. United States v. Klimavisius-Viloria, 144 F.3d
1249, 1261 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding ex parte, in camera hearing appropriate); United States v.
Innamorati, 996 F.2d 456, 487-88 (lst Cir. 1993) (permitting the lower court to rule on an issue ex
parte, in camera in rare situations where confidentiality concerns outweigh the interest in
adversarial litigation); United States v. Pringle, 751 F.2d 419, 426-27 (1 st Cir. 1984); United States
v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233, 1248 (7th Cir, 1979) ("It is settled that in camera exparte proceedings
to evaluate bona fide Government claims regarding national security information are proper."). See
infra note 92 for a discussion of the difference between ex parte proceedings in section 4 and
adversarial ones in section 6 applications.
36. See United States v. Pollard, 290 F. SupP.2d 165, 166 (D.D.C. 2003) (denying the request
of attorneys with high level security clearance to obtain access to client records, refusing to permit
counsel to participate in the in camera review of the documents, and citing a case denying counsel's
ability to view documents).
37. United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
38. Joshua L. Dratel, Ethical Issues in Defending a Terrorism Case: How Secrecy and
Security Impair the Defense of a Terrorism Case, 2 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 81, 90-91,
97-98 (200 1) [hereinafter Dratel, EthicalIssues].
39. Panel Discussion: Criminal Discovery in Practice, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV., 781, 785-86
(1999) (statement of G. Doug Jones) ("[T]he biggest problem I've always had with criminal
discovery.., as [a] United States Attorney, [is that] I have a real hard time convincing my Assistant
U.S. Attorneys that they often don't know what may be material to the defense."). Prosecutors
acting in good faith sometimes become wedded to their theory and cannot recognize alternative
theories. Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with FederalProsecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling
and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 945-47 (1999); MoNROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE
SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 326 (2d ed. 2002) (noting Abbe Smith's view that in
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position, it too, should not be expected to anticipate the material that is
relevant to a defense. While courts are "expected... 'to fashion creative
and fair solutions' for classified information problems, ' 40 in many cases
the court's view is not an adequate substitute for that of competent,
diligent counsel. Moreover, such secrecy from counsel with appropriate
security clearance undermines respect for the process which is so
essential to the maintenance of an effective justice system. 4'
There is a growing concern that CIPA is being used as a back door
means for the government to withhold information otherwise subject to
discovery under Rule 16.42
A recent case, United States v. Mejia, raises the issue of the extent
to which CIPA may be utilized to preclude disclosure of relevant Rule
16 material.4 3 In Mejia, a drug trafficking conspiracy was initiated by the
Drug Enforcement Agency in Costa Rica, and the defendants were
detained in Panama and brought to the United States where they were
44
prosecuted and convicted of one count of conspiracy to import drugs.
The defendant learned, on appeal, that the DOJ had obtained, without
the typical criminal case, "the culture of prosecution fosters rigidity, cynicism, and a tendency to
willful or careless abuse of official power").
40. United States v. Poindexter, 698 F. Supp. 316, 320 (D.D.C. 1988) (quoting S. Rep. No.
96-823 (1980), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4294, 4301).
41. The integrity of the criminal justice system is threatened when the process is one in which
the "government has gained substantial control over proceedings." Rachel S. Holzer, National
Security Versus Defense Counsel's "Need to Know": An Objective Standardfor Resolving the
Tension, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1941, 1966 (2005). At least one court has noted that the government
conflates the public interest with its own position. Al-Marri v. Bush, No. 04-2035, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6259, at *20 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2005) (citing Abdah v. Bush, No. 04-CV-1245, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4144 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2005)).
42. See Holzer, supra note 41, at 1966-67; Saul M. Pilchen & Benjamin B. Klubes, Using the
ClassifiedInformation ProceduresAct in Criminal Cases: A Primerfor Defense Counsel, 31 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 191 (1994); Richard P. Salgado, Government Secrets, FairTrials, and the Classified
Information Procedures Act, 98 YALE L.J. 427, 429 n.17 (1988); Seep, supra note 17, at 234;
Tamahana, supra note 4, at 308 (noting that government use of section 4 ex parte procedures
"threatens to swallow" the protections in section 6).
CIPA heightens the existing informational disadvantage of defense counsel that exists in all
criminal cases. Because the appellate standard for reversal is outcome determinative, there are few
consequences for failure to diligently discharge the duty to produce Brady material in a timely
fashion. United States v. Dumeisi, 424 F.3d 566, 578 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that the failure to
disclose summary of classified information until days before trial is not a "Brady [or Giglio]
violation") (citation omitted); Jay Goldberg, The Adversarial System in Criminal Cases:Achieving
Justice, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 17, 2005 at 4, 8 (citing UnitedStates v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2001))
("It is a common refrain by trial judges that their hands are 'tied' by Coppa and as a result all must
be left to the judgment of the prosecutor.").
43. United States v. Mejia, No. 02-3067, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 19359, at *1-2 (D.C. Cir.
Sept. 6, 2005).
44. United States v. Mejia, No. 02-3067, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13833, at *2-10 (D.C. Cir.
June 2, 2006).
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notice to the prosecutor or the defendant, an ex parte order protecting
from disclosure certain classified materials related to the defendants
"arguably subject to discovery under Fed. R. Crim. P. 16." 4
Apparently, on the eve of trial, the DOJ filed an ex parte, in camera
request that the court review certain material.4 6 The court determined
that it was not Brady material and sealed the file without notice to the
prosecutor or the defendant.47 The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
ordered the parties to brief the issue "whether, to what extent, and under
what circumstances CIPA § 4 and Fed R. Crim P. 16(d)(1) authorize the
non-disclosure of information otherwise arguably subject to discovery
under Rule 16 .'48 The issue framed by the court suggests not only the
preclusion of defense counsel from examination of such classified
material, but that instances where discoverable material is simply not
produced in original, summary or substitute form, there is no notice to
any party and there are no sanctions to the government's case-all
circumstances not contemplated by CIPA.
A second and critical ethical dilemma is that even in cases where
classified information is disclosed to defense counsel, she is prohibited
from sharing the information with her client who does not have security
clearance to review the materials.
As a prominent criminal defense lawyer said:
Instead, in this situation the client has no idea what the classified
information is, but counsel cannot share it with him.... So how do
you know what is relevant and what is not relevant? How do you know
what is good to introduce into evidence and what is bad to introduce
into evidence... ?

45. 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 19359, at *1-2.
46. Id.at *1.
47.

Id.

48. Id.While section 4 permits the United States to make an ex parte requests to the court to
keep information classified and subject to a protective order, it does not authorize non-disclosure of
materials arguably subject to discovery under Rule 16. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53,
59-61 (1957) (explaining that government has informant's privilege, but it cannot prosecute a
defendant without disclosing information relevant and helpful to the defendant, regardless of
whether the government has a weighty interest in maintaining the secrecy of the information);
United States v. Gurolla, 333 F.3d 944, 951 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Innamorati, 996 F.2d
456, 457 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that
CIPA protects a government privilege akin to the informant's privilege, triggering a higher
threshold of demonstrated materiality).
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How do you prepare your client to testify when you have fifteen
49
months of wire taps related to your client that are off limits to him?

Without the ability to utilize the information, counsel often cannot
conduct an adequate investigation and prepare a defense. Significantly,
the preparation of the defendants' potential testimony is severely
hampered when counsel can only confront the evidence against him
selectively. There is no simple resolution of this ethical dilemma.
Perhaps, the only viable result of the appropriate balancing of the
defendant's constitutional rights against the government's national
security concerns may be to provide access to the information to security
cleared defense counsel who is not permitted to share the information
with his client. Most attorneys would rather have access to the
information to defend the case and grapple with this ethical dilemma in
lieu of not having the information. 50
The third significant problem is summary evidence. Even in cases
where the defense lawyer has a high-level security clearance, the lawyer
may have to accept summaries or substituted statements with relevant
facts in lieu of the actual information in the classified documents.5 Such
substitutions not only deprive the defendant of the particulars of the
documents in question, but prohibit the lawyers from utilizing the
underlying facts to develop further exculpatory information. Second,
summary evidence deprives the defendant of the right of confrontation
which guarantees not merely the formal opportunity to cross-examine
but the opportunity for effective cross examination. 52 It is "critical for
49. Joshua L. Dratel, Ethical Issues in Defending a Terrorism Case: Stuck in the Middle, 2
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 65, 69 (2003) [hereinafter EthicalIssues 2]. The problems are
exacerbated where language and cultural barriers exist. See id
50. Some defense lawyers would not choose this resolution because of the inherent conflict it
creates between the lawyer client relationship and the concern that the attorney cannot separate
information he knows from that shared with the client. See Tamanaha, supra note 4, at 289-90
(discussing the difficulties this creates for defense counsel); see also discussion infra Part IV, for
proposals to produce selected information to defendant.
51. CIPA, 18 U.S.C. app. § 4(1982).
52. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404-05 (1965); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,
294-95 (1973) (discussing the fundamental right of confrontation). Summary evidence can be
unreliable. In a carefully crafted opinion that reaffirmed the significance of the defendant's
constitutional rights in a difficult terrorism prosecution, Judge Brinkema held that the summaries of
reports of the detainee's interrogation prepared by government officials in district court were
unreliable. United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 478 (4th Cir. 2004). The defendant, known as
the twentieth hijacker, who appeared pro se, claimed that depositions of "enemy combatants" in
U.S. custody overseas could exonerate him of responsibility for September I1.The district court
ruled that his Fifth Amendment due process right and his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory
process outweighed the government's national security interest for access to government detainees
who possessed relevant and material exculpatory information. See United States v. Moussaoui, No.
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ensuring the integrity of the fact-finding process' and 'is the principal
means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his
testimony are tested."' 53 If we continue to believe that cross-examination
is the engine that drives the trial process, depriving a defendant of such
possibility must only occur in the most particularized circumstances of
demonstrated need for secrecy where the defense lawyer has participated
in the process of making that determination.54 While Congress urged
judges to ensure that admissions and summaries were crafted so that the
government obtained no unfair advantage in the trial, the practice of
"substitutions and stipulations" can significantly alter the adversary
process. 55 They are "powerful weapons for the prosecution with a high
potential for abuse. 56
A recent death penalty case, United States v. Denis, is illustrative of
the limitations on effective cross-examination by the use of summary
evidence.5 7 In Denis, the defendants were charged with conspiracy with
intent to distribute cocaine and using or carrying a firearm during a drug
trafficking crime.5 8 Avila, a key government witness claimed that he
caught Denis on tape admitting to being the shooter. Denis denied it and

CR. 01-455-A, 2003 WL 21263699, at *5 (E.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2003); see also United States v.
Moussaoui, 282 F. SupP.2d 480, 482 (E.D. Va. 2003); United States v. Moussaoui, No. CR. 01-455A, 2003 WL 22258213 (E.D. Va. Aug. 29, 2003); United States v. Collins, 720 F.2d 1195, 1198
(11 th Cir. 1983) (holding that substitutions are not sufficiently specific); United States v. Clegg, 740
F.2d 16, 18 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding substitutions inadequate).
53. United States v. Begay, 937 F.2d 515, 520 (10th Cir. 1991).
54. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 5 EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367 (3d ed. 1940);
Peter Margulies provides detailed analysis of the problems created by summary evidence. See
generally Margulies, supra note 2 (noting that summary evidence has minimized impact before a
jury).
55. United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding no abuse of
discretion for summary substitution). The constitutionality of the use of testimonial substitutions has
not been decided. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (holding that confrontation
clause bars admission of all testimonial hearsay unless the accused has had an opportunity, at or
before trial, to cross-examine the declarant witness); Joshua Dratel, The Impact of Crawford v.
Washington on Terrorism Prosecutions,28 CHAMPION 19 (2004).
56. Tamanaha, supra note 4, at 306. Beyond the ethical issues, there are procedural hurdles in
cases involving classified information which increase the defense lawyer's difficulty in defending a
case. The mechanics of reviewing CIPA materials is necessarily onerous and time consuming.
Classified information can only be reviewed in a Secure Compartmentalized Information Facility
("SCIF") by a person who has undergone a comprehensive security investigation and is "cleared" to
gain access to CIPA materials. See Act of Oct. 15, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025, §§ 1-4;
Gerald E. Rosen, United States District Court Judge, The War on Terrorism in the Courts, Remarks
at the Thomas M. Cooley Law School Distinguished Brief Award Banquet (July 24, 2004), in 21
T.M. COOLEY L. REV 159, 164 (2004).
57. See United States v. Denis, 246 F. SupP.2d 1250 (S.D. Fla. 2002), af'd, No. 03-11086,
107 Fed. Appx. 182 (11 th Cir. May 13, 2004).
58. Id.at 1252.
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claimed that Avila doctored the audiotape. 59 The government, on the
third day of trial, announced that a CIPA issue had arisen. 60 After
chastising the prosecution for failure to raise the issue earlier, and
conducting an ex parte, in camera hearing,6' the court ruled that the
government had to disclose some of the information pursuant to Brady v.
Maryland,62 but permitted a substitute pleading in lieu of crossexamination.6 3 That pleading referred to Avila as an "intelligence asset"
and gave two reasons for his termination from the FBI including their
belief that he had "'edited or spliced' a tape-recording. '" 64 The defendant
was not permitted to obtain the name of the agent who terminated Avila
from the FBI for use in its defense.65 When Avila testified, the defense
was precluded from cross-examining him about being a spy for the
Cuban government, and having received Cuban spy training.66 The
defense argued that it could not adequately attack Avila's credibility
because the substitutions prevented questioning him about the previously
doctored tapes, his training as a double agent and his motive to testify to
avoid prosecution for espionage.67 The court's rejection of the defense
contentions was upheld on appeal.6 8 Denis was convicted on all counts.69
D. ForeignIntelligence Surveillance Act
A second form of secret evidence, often intertwined with and
exacerbated by the problems created by CIPA, is information obtained
pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"). FISA,
enacted in 1978 to regulate the government's use of electronic
surveillance to gather foreign intelligence information, requires that the
59. Brief of Appellant at 42-43, United States v. Denis, No. 03-11806-EE (1 th Cir. 2003).
60. Id.at 10.
61. Id. By raising the CIPA issue mid-trial, the government avoided section 6 of CIPA which
provides for a pretrial hearing with both the government and defendant in attendance at which the
court determines the use, admissibility, and relevance of the classified information. CIPA, 18 U.S.C.
app. § 6 (1982). Instead, the government invoked section 4 of CIPA which applies only to the
discovery of classified information by defendants. Id.at § 4. There is no record of the proceeding
because there was no court reporter available with the appropriate security clearance. See infra note
92 explaining the government's tactical use of section 4 to avoid an adversary hearing.
62. Brief of Appellant, supra note 59, at 11 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)).
63. Id.at 11.
64. Id.
65. Id.at 12-13.

66. Id.at 13.
67. Id.at 13-14. The Miami Herald newspaper had revealed Avila to be a double agent of the
United States and Cuba. Cynthia Corzo & Alfonso Chardy, Cuba Sent Coded Orders on Radio, Spy
Says, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 17, 1992, at 19A.
68. United States v. Denis, 107 Fed. Appx. 182 (11 th Cir. 2004).

69. See Brief of Appellant, supra note 59, at 13.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol34/iss3/14

14

Yaroshefsky: Secret Evidence Is Slowly Eroding the Adversary System: CIPA and
2006]

SECRET EVIDENCE

government seek a warrant from a statutorily created FISA court upon
an ex parte showng that that the target of the surveillance is an "agent of
a foreign power," where "agent" is broadly defined to include any
officer or employee of a foreign power.7 °
FISA initially required the government to certify that the purpose of
71
the surveillance was to obtain foreign intelligence information.
Legislative history and subsequent case law established that the
government had to demonstrate that its "primary purpose" was to gather
evidence for foreign intelligence rather than criminal prosecution.72 The
2001 PATRIOT Act expanded the government's powers under FISA and
permits a wide range of surveillance techniques in a broader range of
circumstances without a showing of probable cause, so long as a
"significant purpose" of the intrusion is to collect foreign intelligence.73

70. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b) (2000). FISA provides, in part, that the government may obtain a
warrant for "a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor," id.
§ 1801(a)(4), or any person who "acts on behalf of a foreign power.., or when such person
knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of such activities." Id. § 1801 (b)(1)(B). "Foreign
power" includes a "foreign-based political organization, not substantially composed of United
States persons." Id. § 1801(a)(5). An employee of Amnesty International could be such an agent.
See Cole, supra note 3, at 973.
"International terrorism" encompasses a broad range of crimes including activities that
(1)involve violent acts.., that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States
or of any State... [or]
(2) appear to be intended(a) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(b) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(c) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping ....
Id. § 1801(c).
71. Id. § 1804(a)(7)(A)-(B). The "primary purpose" standard, derived from legislative history,
was established by case law. See Richard Henry Seamon & William Dylan Gardner, The PatriotAct
and the Wall Between ForeignIntelligence and Law Enforcement, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 319,
358-67 (2005) (tracing the history of FISA and the primary purpose doctrine, and arguing that case
law is wrong); Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1306, 1337 n.217 (2004).
72. See United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 915 (4th Cir. 1980) ("[T]he
executive should be excused from securing a warrant only when the surveillance is conducted
'primarily' for foreign intelligence reasons."); United States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458, 1464 (1 1th
Cir. 1987) (upholding telephone surveillance because its "primary objective" was "acquiring foreign
intelligence information," not "investigating a criminal act"); United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d
1067, 1076 (4th Cir. 1987) (finding surveillance to be legal because its "primary purpose ...was to
gather foreign intelligence information"); J. Christopher Champion, The Revamped FISA: Striking a
Better Balance Between the Government's Need to Protect Itself and the Fourth Amendment, 58
VAND. L. REv. 1671, 1672-86 (2005) (discussing the evolution and development of the "primary
purpose" test).
73. FISA powers were amended by the PATRIOT Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11 (2001), and
further amended by Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108458, § 102A(f)(6), 118 Stat. 3638, 3650 (2004) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.S. §§ 403-1
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The FISA court's judicial approval process remains secret with rare
exception.74 Rarely is a government application rejected.7 5

The existence of the FISA warrant is kept secret unless the person
is prosecuted using the evidence seized.76 In such a prosecution, the
relevant information obtained by FISA is subject to discovery, but unlike
those based upon probable cause, the defendant is not entitled to obtain
the underlying warrant, 77 nor is the defendant entitled to receive all of
the FISA wiretaps of his own conversations.7 8 And, judicial review is
limited; the court cannot "second guess" the accuracy of the executive
branch's certification that the purpose of the surveillance is to gather
foreign intelligence information.79

(LexisNexis 2004)); In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 746 (Foreign Int.
Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002)
(holding, inter alia,that the significant purpose test satisfies the Fourth Amendment).
74. For a glimpse into the FISA court's operation, see In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 and In
re All Matters Submitted to the FISA Court, 218 F. SupP.2d 611 (Foreign Int.
Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002)
[hereinafter FISA Trial Court Opinions].
75. Only five of 14,000 warrant applications were rejected by the FISA court prior to 2001.
Dahlia Lithwick & Julia Turner, A Guide to the Patriot Act, Part 2, SLATE, Sept. 9, 2003,
http://www.slate.come/id/2088106. This occurred, even though the FISA trial court, in a rare
opinion, established that at least 75 of those warrants were based on false allegations. FISA Trial
Court Opinions, 218 F. SupP.2d at 620-21.
76. 50 U.S.C.S. § 1825(g) (LexisNexis 2002). The target of the approved surveillance may
never learn of such surveillance unless the government seeks to use the information obtained against
the person in a subsequent prosecution. 50 U.S.C. § 1806 (b)-(g) (2000).
77. The relevant statute provides that a defendant challenging a FISA application may be
permitted to review the application and order when disclosure is "necessary to make an accurate
determination of the legality of the surveillance." 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f). The statute also provides that
if the Attorney General files an affidavit stating that "disclosure or an adversary hearing would harm
the national security of the United States," the court must consider the application and order in
camera review to determine if the surveillance was lawful. Id.Although the defendant may move
for disclosure of the underlying warrant, there are no known cases where the disclosure has been
made. Dratel, EthicalIssues, supra note 38, at 94; see, e.g., United States v. Rahman, 861 F. Supp.
247 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), affd, 189 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 982 (finding that
application for FISA warrant contained sufficient information that defendants knowingly engaged in
sabotage or international terrorism, or aided and abetted another in doing do so, thus they are
"agents of a foreign power" within the meaning of FISA); United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959,
962-64 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that a warrantless search "requires exigent circumstances supported
by probable cause," and allowing the search because there was not sufficient time to obtain a
warrant); United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 78 (2d Cir. 1984) (upholding trial court's refusal to
disclose FISA warrant as not necessary for accurate determination of the legality of the
surveillance).
78. See, e.g., Rahman, 861 F. Supp at 250-51 (denying defendants access to their own
recorded conversations because such disclosure was not necessary to determine whether the
surveillance was legal).
79. Duggan, 743 F.2d at 77.
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Perhaps the most important and controversial provision of the
PATRIOT Act, FISA warrants threaten to become an "end run around
the probable cause requirements" of the Fourth Amendment. 0
In terrorism-related indictments, international drug conspiracies,
and other cases in which the government has sought a FISA warrant, it
often has thousands of hours of conversations. 8 ' Typically, those
conversations are classified.
Recent cases demonstrate a recurrent problem with FISA generated
information in criminal prosecutions: the government selectively
declassifies intercepted communications to aid its case against the
declassify all of the
defendants, but will not, and need not under CIPA,
82
conversations that contain its own conversations.
In United States v. Al Hussayen, where a doctoral student was
prosecuted for providing material support to a terrorist organization for
alleged online assistance in recruiting and financing terrorism, the
government refused to declassify thousands of FISA interceptions of the
defendant's telephone conversations and e-mails.83 It only declassified
the ones that it intended to use against him, arguing that while
declassified communications are alleged to be incriminating, classified
communications are not. 4 Significantly, in derogation of its duty under
Brady v. Maryland,5 the government argued that it could not be
responsible for identifying exculpatory evidence within such material
because it could not digest all of the interceptions.8 6 The defense claimed
that the government's tactical and selective use of the classification

80. Cole, supra note 3, at 974 (discussing probable cause in the context of the criminal
wiretap statute); David Cole, Imaginary Walls and Unnecessary Fixes, in PATRIOT DEBATES:
EXPERTS DEBATE THE USA PATRIOT ACT (2005), availableat http://www.patriotdebates.com/218-2
(discussing the "questionable constitutionality" of FISA section 218); Champion, supra note 72, at
1672-73 nn.8-9 (citing case law that states that the Act is not to be used as such an "end run");
Erwin Chemerinsky, Losing Liberties: Applying a Foreign Intelligence Model to Domestic Law
Enforcement, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1619, 1624-27 (2004) (discussing the tension between FISA
procedures and Fourth Amendment requirements).
81. See Dratel, Ethical Issues, supra note 38, at 87-92. Notably in terrorism cases, the
conversations are predominantly in Arabic and there are often few qualified translators who are
willing to apply for a security clearance. See id. at 87.
82. See infra notes 83-87.
83. Case No. 03-048-C-EJL (D. Idaho 2003).
84. See Reply to Response to Motion to Require Defense to Accept Discovery, United States
v. AI-Hussayen, No. 03-048-C-EJL (D. Idaho 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter Reply to
Response to Discovery Motion]. Some districts, such as the United States Attorneys' Office for the
Southern District of New York, typically declassify and disclose all of defendant's conversations
obtained pursuant to FISA wiretaps.
85. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
86. Reply to Response to Discovery Motion, supra note 84, at 2-3.
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authority denied Al-Huyassen with "functional access to exculpatory
intercepts. 8 7
While the government's position in Al-Huyassen appears to be an
extreme, in a number of cases it has neither translated nor declassified
many tape recordings made pursuant to FISA.88
In United States v. Sami Al-Arian, a recent high profile case where
a college professor was charged with seventeen crimes arising out of
alleged support and leadership of Hamas, a Palestinian Islamic Jihad
organization designated as "terrorist," the government resisted
declassifying thousands of the defendant's own conversations that were
intercepted pursuant to FISA until "encouragement" by the court. s9 In
United States v. Holy Land Foundationfor Relief and Development,
where defendants are charged with providing material support to
designated Palestinian terrorist organizations, the government produced
15,000 transcripts of FISA wiretaps that are under review by defense
counsel and subject to a protective order. 90 The vast majority of FISA
transcripts of the defendants' own conversations have not been
declassified and are not translated. The defendant cannot review the
documents to advise his lawyer which conversations might be most
helpful to his defense.
These cases suggest that procedures that were designed to protect
classified information from tactical advantage by a defendant have been
utilized inadvertently or intentionally by the government for its tactical
advantage. Discovery that might otherwise be provided pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 or Brady v. Maryland is, as a
consequence of FISA and CIPA, either not disclosed, or disclosed in
summary form such that defense counsel cannot conduct necessary
91
investigation and prepare a defense.

87. Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Declare CIPA Unconstitutional as Applied
in This Case, United States v. AI-Hussayen, CR-03-048-C-EJL (D. Idaho 2005) (on file with
author). This is the first known instance of the government's denial of the defendant's own
intercepted telephonic or electronic communications. Moreover, the government did not provide a
security clearance for an Arabic interpreter thus making it impossible for counsel to have access to
the conversations. This matter is not reported. The defendant was found not guilty by a jury.
88. Id; see infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Elaine Silvestrini, AI-Arian Gains Access to Evidence, TAMPA TRIB., Aug. 28,
2003, at 1.
90. Indictment at 12, No. 04-CR-240G (N.D. Tex. July 26, 2004).
91. The government has effectively utilized section 4 of CIPA to deprive the court of input
from defense counsel. In cases where the government should have made a section 6 application,
thereby permitting the issues to be addressed in an adversary proceeding, it filed an application
under section 4 which is treated as an ex parte secret proceeding. See, e.g., United States v. Rezaq,
134 F.3d 1121, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1990);

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol34/iss3/14

18

Yaroshefsky: Secret Evidence Is Slowly Eroding the Adversary System: CIPA and
20061

III.
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SECRET EVIDENCE IS SEEPING INTO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM

The impact of secret evidence upon the adversary system has yet to
be acknowledged, in large measure because of the unstated belief that
FISA and CIPA are confined to a narrow range of terrorism cases. Secret
evidence, however, is likely to have a widespread effect on the federal
criminal justice system for at least three reasons.
First, the executive branch, notorious for over-classification of
documents prior to this administration, has greatly enhanced its
classification of documents and is now classifying documents at an
unheralded pace.92 Since 2001, it has doubled the number of documents
that are classified to fifteen million a year, and has authorized additional
governmental offices empowered to classify information.93 Thus, CIPA
will be invoked in an expanded number of cases.
Moreover, since 2001,
94
FISA warrants have increased dramatically.
Salgado, supra note 42, at 429 n.17; Tamanaha, supra note 4, at 307-08 (explaining that section 4
threatens to swallow protections contained in section 6 because the government may produce all of
the discoverable information in the form of exparte approved substitutions).
92. It is widely recognized that "the Federal Government exhibits a proclivity for overclassification of information." Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wright, J.
concurring) (quoting former Sen. Baker).
93. Editorial, The Dangerous Comfort of Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2005, at A20. As the
New York Times recently editorialized:
The Bush Administration is classifying the documents to be kept from public
scrutiny at the rate of 125 a minute.

No one questions the need for governments to keep secret things that truly
need to be kept secret, especially in combating terrorists. But the
government's addiction to secrecy is making an unnecessary casualty of the
openness vital to democracy.
Id.
Agencies such as the Agriculture Department and the Federal Information Security
Oversight Office are classifying documents, "cloaking nonlethal cases of mismanagement and
bureaucratic embarrassment." Id. Thus, over-classification of documents is not unique to this
administration.
94. See generally Electronic Privacy Information Center, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act Orders 1979-2004, http://www.epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa-stats.html (last visited Apr. 3,
2006). President George W. Bush criticized the use of secret evidence for new immigrants, and
commented that "secret evidence... [was] a creature of the Clinton/Gore Justice Department," and
pledged to work with legislative leaders to "ensure respect for the law-and for all law-abiding
citizens." Letter from Laura W. Murphy, Director of the Washington National Office of the ACLU,
to President Bush on the Use of Secret Evidence in Immigration Proceedings (July 13, 2001),
available at http://www.aclu.org/immigrants/evidence/117851eg20010713.html (quoting a written
statement made by President Bush). Despite this statement, secret evidence problems are
exacerbated in the Bush administration. See supra note 93.
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Second, "terrorism-related" prosecutions, where FISA and CIPA
are invoked, involve a wide range of criminal statutes that demonstrate
the government's strained expansive interpretation of the term
"terrorism." 95 This phenomenon predated 9/11. A Government
Accountability Office ("GAO") study of criminal prosecutions that the
Justice Department categorized as terrorism from 1997 to 2001 "were
nothing of the sort, frequently involving such subjects as mentally9 6ill
individuals, drunken airline passengers and convicts rioting for food.,
Terrorism prosecutions subsequent to 2001 have similarly strained
classifications. Journalists analyzing cases categorized as terrorism by
the federal government demonstrated that many of these cases had
questionable links to "terrorist violence." In Iowa, an in-depth analysis
of thirty-five terrorism-related cases revealed that most of the defendants
were ultimately charged with fraud or theft.97 U.S. District Court Judge

Robert Pratt, who presided over at least six of the cases said, "If there
have been terrorism-related arrests in Iowa, I haven't heard about
them., 98 In Indiana, ten cases federal prosecutors categorized as99being
related to terrorism were hardly those involving terrorist violence.
This phenomenon is not unique to the "war on terrorism."
Historically, the government has stretched the meaning of statutes
beyond their original intent. As the late Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, in

95. See TERRORIST TRIALS, supra note 2 at 3 (documenting the categories of crime
encompassed within "terrorism," including false statements, document fraud, immigration fraud,
firearms, financial crimes, national security, terrorism support, and others). See generally Matthew
Piers, Malevolent Destruction of a Muslim Charity: A Commentary on the Prosecution of
Benevolence InternationalFoundation,25 PACE L. REv. 339 (2005). Piers explains that terrorism
was originally defined as "actions calculated to create fear among a civilian population and has
come to mean acts of a violent nature with a political purpose." Id. at 339 n.8.
96. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse ("TRAC"), TRAC at Work,
http://www.trac.syr.edu/tracatwork/articles/congress/GA00302.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2006)
(citing GAO report).
97. Bert Dalmer, U.S. Links 35 Arrests in Iowa to Terror, DES MOINES REGISTER, July 18,
available
at
http://www.dmregister.com/apps/pbcs.dllarticle?AID=/
2004,
=
20040718/NEWSO/407180386/1001&lead 1.
98. Id.
99. Shannon Tan, "'TerrorRelated" Cases Really Aren't, Critics Say, INDIANAPOLIS STAR,
Apr. 7, 2003, at IB ("[M]any prosecutions that federal official labeled 'antiterrorism' were actually
for minor crimes ....
").See generally Eric Lichtblau, Threats and Responses: Prosecutions;Terror
Cases Rise, but Most are Small-Scale, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2003, at A16. Nearly
seventy-five percent of cases labeled "terrorism" are for document and credit card fraud. Eric
Lichtblau, U.S. Uses Terror Law to Pursue Crimes From Drugs to Swindling, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28,
2003, § 1, at 1. The government may, of course, charge persons it believes to be "terrorists" with
lesser crimes such as document or credit card fraud for a number of reasons, including its interest in
protecting information from discovery. TERRORIST TRIALS, supra note 2, at 2 (recommending
reconsideration of this strategy).
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commenting upon the RICO statute, the "legislative history of the RICO
Act strongly suggests that Congress never intended that civil RICO
should be used, as it is today, in ordinary commercial disputes far
divorced from the influences of organized crime." 100 Similarly, forfeiture
statutes to combat the "war on drugs" have been invoked in
circumstances that distort the statute's purpose.'
Such unintended use
of statutes can be expected to continue in the "war on terrorism," which
has no definable end.
Third, and perhaps of greatest significance, CIPA and FISA will
necessarily be invoked in a greater number of prosecutions
because of
10 2
enforcement.
law
and
crime
of
the internationalization
At the dawn of the next millennium, and looking back over the past
century, perhaps no single phenomenon is of greater significance to
criminal justice in America than the international dimensions of crime
and justice. In a relatively short period of time, the world has changed
dramatically, and the physical boundaries that separated countries have
given way to a global economy, instantaneous communication, and the
ability to span the globe in less than a day. With these events have
come numerous changes that profoundly affect the rule of law and the
criminal justice system in the United States as well in other
countries. 03

This includes cases that span international boundaries involving
allegations of money laundering, bribery, various forms of corruption,
economic espionage, export of controlled items, weapons production,
and distribution, as well as government contracts with other nations. In
short, classified information will infect the criminal justice system.

100. William Rehnquist, Get RICO Cases Out of My Courtroom, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1989,
at A14; see A. Laxmidas Sawkar, From the Mafia to Milking Cows: State RICO Act Expansion, 41
ARIz. L. REv. 1133 (1999); see also David B. Sentelle, Civil RICO: The Judges' Perspective,and
Some Notes on Practicefor North CarolinaLawyers, 12 CAMPBELL L. REv. 145, 146 (1990).
101. Steven B. Duke, Drug Prohibition:An UnnaturalDisaster,27 CONN. L. REv. 571, 58990 (1995) ("As a result of drug war forfeiture precedents, we are now positioned in principle to take
the homes and offices of anyone who commits, or permits others to commit, any crime on the
premises ....).
102. See infra note 104. Classification pertains to matters of national security whose definition
includes "foreign relations." See supra note 23. All matters with international dimensions pertain to
foreign relations. See supra note 70.
103. Richard H. Ward, The Internationalizationof Criminal Justice, in 2 CRIMINAL JUSTICE
2000, at 267, 270 (2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/intemational/internat.pdf; see
also PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 104TH CONG., IC21: THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY
IN
THE
21ST
CENTURY
available
at
http://www.fas.
(1996),

org/irp/congress/1996_rpt/ic21/ic21013.htm
security concern).

(finding that international crime poses a national
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The very fact that the use of secret evidence will become a
recurrent issue rather than an exception in federal criminal cases implies
that there will be a slowly shifting norm toward greater tolerance of a
more limited role for the defense lawyer and increasingly limited
interpretations of the defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
While some courts have been exquisitely sensitive to the adversary
process and have insured the preservation of fundamental rights,' °4
reliance upon judicial remedies should be guarded at best. Despite recent
judicial skepticism about the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and
blanket assertions of national security, 10 5 it is too soon to know whether
a skeptical approach will become normative. Historically, courts have
imposed some limitations where the government stretches 06a statute
beyond its intent, but such judicial action is not commonplace. 1
In fact, excessive legislative and judicial deference to executive
10 7
claims of national security is the norm in perceived "times of crisis.',
From the excesses of the prosecution of World War I dissenters, to the
excesses of surveillance during the Vietnam War, government
overreaching in highly charged situations is well documented. 10 8 Regret
and repudiation become the response to such deference some forty to
fifty years later. Judicial skepticism about government assertions of
national security suggest that at least some courts have been vigilant
104. See, e.g., Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005) (denying government's request to
transfer U.S. citizen detainee because it appeared that the attempt to do so was to avoid Supreme
Court review); Hanft v. Padilla, 126 S. Ct. 978 (2005) (reversing the Court of Appeals decision that
the President possessed authority to detain enemy combatant); Al-Marri v. Bush, No. 04-2035, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6259, at * 1-2 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2005) (granting Guantanamo detainee's request for
thirty days notice before transfer); Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-1409-JG SMG, 2005 WL
2375202 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005) (refusing to dismiss civil rights case challenging classification
and continued confinement of Muslim prisoners in maximum security unit); United States v.
Moussaoui, 282 F. SupP.2d 480 (E.D. Va. 2003) (striking government's notice of death penalty and
precluding introduction of evidence related to 9/11 where prosecution did not make potential
exculpatory evidence available to defendant); United States v. Koubriti, 305 F. SupP.2d 723 (E.D.
Mich. 2003) (formally admonishing Attorney General Ashcroft for violating court order limiting
extrajudicial comment); United States v. Sattar, 272 F. SupP.2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (dismissing,
on constitutional grounds, terrorism charge in indictment against attorney Lynne Stewart and
others).
105. See supra notes 5,104.
106. See Ellen S. Podgor, Jose Padilla and Martha Stewart: Who Should be Charged with
Criminal Conduct?, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1059, 1063 (2005); Margulies, supra note 2, at 465-89.
107. Margulies, supra note 2, at 507.
108. DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 68-77 (2002);
HAYNES JOHNSON, THE AGE OF ANXIETY: MCCARTHYISM TO TERRORISM (2005); Cole, supra note

3, at 955; Peter Margulies, Judging Terror in the "Zone of Twilight": Exigency, InstitutionalEquity
and ProcedureAfter September 11, 84 B.U. L. REV. 383, 394 (2004); Charles D. Weisselberg, The
Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessonsfrom the Lives of Ellen Knauffand Ignatz Mezei, 143 U.
PA. L. REV. 933 (1995) (discussing Attorney General McGrath's use of secret evidence).
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about the judicial role and the lessons of history. It remains, of course,
too soon to tell whether historians will look more charitably at executive
and judicial decision-making in the post-9/1 1 era.
Moreover, the lack of empirical data about the use of CIPA and
FISA will permit this issue to escape warranted scrutiny. Apart from
careful analyses by investigative journalists and occasional reports by
the GAO, little attention is focused upon the nature of cases in which
secret evidence is used.'0 9
Much of the data about secret evidence is secret and subject to
protective orders. There are, for instance, no data on (1) the number or
certainly the nature of CIPA proceedings within criminal cases to
determine the extent to which classified information with otherwise
discoverable information is subject to a balancing test of national
security versus materiality and relevancy prior to production to the
defense; (2) the number and nature of cases in which the proceedings are
all ex parte; (3) the nature of protective orders;" 0 (4) the use and
particulars of summary evidence; or (5) the extent to which sanctions are
imposed for the government's decision not to declassify and produce
discoverable material. Few of these issues appear in reported cases."'
Criminal defense lawyers are under protective orders and cannot answer
obvious questions to draw conclusions about the systemic effects of2 the
use of FISA and CIPA. Information about secret evidence is secret." 1
Without such data, these cases, illustrative of the manner in which
secret evidence infects and distorts the adversary system, will be viewed
as aberrational, limited to "serious terrorism" charges and insufficiently
numerous to deserve significant attention. Such a conclusion should be
viewed skeptically. Historically, cases demonstrating problems in the
criminal justice system, such as those of eyewitness identification,
laboratory procedures, and methods of police interrogation, were
dismissed initially as aberrational.' 1 3 Until DNA permitted conclusive
scientific proof of innocence, there was systemic resistance to such

109.
110.

See supranotes 92-99.
United States v. Musa, 833 F. Supp. 752, 754 (E.D. Mo. 1993) (noting that there are few

cases discussing section 3 protective orders).
111. Most of the reported cases are cited in this Article.
112. Telephone conferences and interviews with prosecutors and more than fifteen criminal
defense lawyers (June-Nov. 2005).
113.

See generally JiM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE (2001) (cataloguing documented

reasons for wrongful convictions which were dismissed as anecdotal or aberrant until DNA
established scientific proof of innocence); Fred C. Zacharias, The Role of Prosecutors in Serving
JusticeAfter Convictions, 58 VAND. L. REv. 171, 178-79 (2005).
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claims.'14 In other words, the anecdotal, collective wisdom of
experienced defense counsel ought to be taken seriously. Traditionally
this has not been the case. 1 5
IV.

MODEST PROPOSALS

Legislation is required to remedy the systemic problems created by
secret evidence. First, it is necessary to hold FISA accountable to the
adversary process by permitting defendants to have access to the
underlying FISA warrants. 16 Second, CIPA should be revised to provide
7
for a clear process for discovery and admissibility of evidence. 1
Short of legislative action, there are several modest workable
proposals that will assist in securing fundamental rights that lie at the
core of our adversary system.
First, with explicit recognition that the ethical dilemmas created by
FISA and CIPA infect every aspect of the attorney-client relationship
and should be minimized, there should be a presumption that defense
counsel, with appropriate security clearances, will participate in the
review of classified information to determine disclosure issues. Rarely
has a court included defense counsel in the discovery process.18 After
the court's initial review of the government's exparte application and its
exclusion of material that is wholly irrelevant, the court should hold
either an in camera proceeding with defense counsel or an adversarial
proceeding to hear argument as to disclosure of the classified
information. With the benefit of carefully articulated reasons as to

114. DWYER ET AL., supra note 113.
115. See generally Abbe Smith, Defending Defending: The Case for Unmitigated Zeal on
Behalf of People Who Do Terrible Things, 28 HOFSTRA L. REv. 925 (2000); Abbe Smith, The
Difference in Criminal Defense and the Difference it Makes, 11 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 83 (2003);
Marvin D. Miller, A Conversation with Sam Dash, 23 CHAMPION 22 (June 1999).
116. See Cole, Imaginary Walls and Unnecessary Fixes,supra note 80.
117. See Salgado, supra note 42, at 442 (arguing that CIPA should provide for a discovery
process that instructs a court to resolve relevance issues before deciding upon privilege questions);
Holzer, supra note 41, at 1970-84 (arguing for a ten part analysis to determine whether classified
information should be disclosed).
118. Despite the fact that these ex parte proceedings are "proper," they are not required by
CIPA. See United States v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233, 1248 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 965-66 (approving ex parte balancing by court). Such practice should be
reevaluated. CIPA invokes unique issues of excluding significant evidence because of national
security "balancing" that is not present in other circumstances where courts conduct ex parte
proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Muldeig, 120 F.3d 534, 540 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding ex
parte review appropriate to withhold irrelevant evidence); United States v. Pelton, 578 F.2d 701,
707 (8th Cir. 1978) (upholding exparte proceeding to avoid revealing identity of witnesses); see In
re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183, 1187-88 (2d Cir. 1977) (discussing various exparte procedures).
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relevance, materiality and national security, the court's decision as to
disclosure will be more frilly informed." 9
Defense counsel with such security clearance should be afforded
presumptive access to the arguably relevant classified information. This
is the accepted practice in military courts where both military and
security-cleared defense counsel have access to such classified
information. 120 While military lawyers operate within a closed system
that imposes a set of shared values, the structure of the federal criminal
justice system has significant parallels.
Our constitutionalized adversary system relies upon the tripartite
system of judge, prosecutor and defense lawyer. The defense lawyer,
like the court and prosecutor, is sworn to uphold the Constitution and is
bound by ethical rules that govern the profession. Due deference and
respect for the critical role of defense counsel as the guardian of
individual liberties dictates that counsel be included in the process
similar to that of military counsel. Defense counsel, who are responsible
for insuring compliance with protective orders and other impositions
upon traditional aspects of the attorney-client relationship, are
exquisitely sensitive to their role and its limitations. Representing the
most despised of the culture and operating under difficult circumstances,
these lawyers do their utmost to embody the noble traditions of zealous
lawyering for a client within the difficult bounds imposed by various
regulations and protective orders. 121 They have secured the highest
levels of clearance to review classified information. Any concern about
the risk of disclosure of classified information should be tempered by the
fact that lawyers are keenly aware that they risk criminal prosecution for
unauthorized disclosure of such information. No lawyer willingly

119. Generalized invocation that disclosure will "breach national security" should not be
sufficient because "information may be gratuitously classified." Holzer, supra note 41, at 1967
(citations omitted) (arguing for objective ten part test to determine whether information should be
disclosed).
120. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MILITARY COMMISSION ORDER NO. 1, § 4(C)(3)(b)(iv)
(Aug. 31, 2005) (entitling accused to retain civilian counsel, if counsel has security clearance of
Secret or higher); id. § 6(D)(5)(a)-(b) (governing protective orders and limited disclosures of
classified information). In United States v. King, 53 M.J. 425 (C.A.A.F. 2000), the government
refused to grant all of the client's defense attorneys the same level of clearance to review documents
and requested that a monitor with the highest level of clearance be part of defense consultations.
The court, denying the government's requests, held that all the lawyers must have the same level of
clearance to review classified documents. See id. Otherwise counsel would be unable to consult
with one another. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces denied the request for a monitor. See
id; see also David E. Rovella, Defense in Spy Case Cries Foul, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 21, 2000, at A 11.
121. See generally Dratel, Ethical Issues 2, supra note 49.
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undertakes such a risk.' 22 Given the stakes for a proper functioning of
the adversary system, any lingering apprehension1 23should cede to
inclusion of the defense lawyer in this critical process.
Second, upon a particularized and strong showing of the need to
share documents with a client, the court should engage in careful
analysis to determine whether specified documents are essential for
client review, and, in such cases, strongly urge the government to
declassify the documents, find a substitute means to allow the defendant
to review the essential information, or impose sanctions.1 24 While the
protection of national security requires balancing with fundamental Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rights, the government's concerns should be
particularized and the ultimate balance exquisitely crafted to insure that
the compromise is as minimally invasive as possible of the attorneyclient relationship and client's constitutional rights. 25 Our "fragile
126
system of accountability at the heart of our criminal justice system"'
requires preservation of the effective12 7assistance of defense counsel, a
right from which all other rights flow.
V.

CONCLUSION

The recent terrorism related and international drug conspiracy cases
raise significant questions about distortions in the adversary system
through the use of classified and other secret information. The defense
lawyer is hampered in her ability to carry out her ethical mandates to
competently, diligently and zealously represent her client. Particularly in
the age of over-classification of documents and internationalization of
crime and law enforcement, there exists serious concern that CIPA and
FISA procedures, heretofore accepted as constitutional, are eroding
fundamental Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. If secret evidence
122. Similar concerns are not expressed for court security officers with appropriate clearance
who have access to the classified information. See Act of Oct. 15, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94
Stat. 2025, § 2.
123. The parties should be afforded notice of the fact of a section 4 request. Notice to the
parties would at least permit the defense (and perhaps the prosecutor) to make appropriate inquiry
regarding the existence of Brady or FRCP 16 material. See supra notes 57-69 and accompanying
text.
124. See Holzer, supra note 41, at 1970-84 (suggesting a ten part analysis for determination of
whether classified evidence is necessary for defendant's case).
125. See generally Sam A. Schmidt & Joshua L. Dratel, Turning the Tables: Using the
Government's Secrecy and Security Arsenalfor the Benefit of the Client in Terrorism Prosecutions,
48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 69, 74 (2004).
126. Margulies, supra note 2, at 455.
127. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 14, at 13 n.5 (citing Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism
and State CriminalProcedure,70 HARV. L REv. 1, 8 (1957)).
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results in distortion in Article III courts where defendants have
fundamental constitutional rights, the concerns are amplified for other
tribunals.
With recognition of the executive's role in assuring the nation's
safety and being cautious about separation of powers concerns, the
courts and legislature should recognize that secret evidence has and will
continue to distort the functioning of our delicately balanced adversary
system. Procedures should be adopted to insure the proper respect for
and maintenance of the defense lawyer's role.
QUESTION AND ANSWER

PROFESSOR SIMON: Thank you very much. No doubt that has
stirred some people who want to go to the microphone to ask questions.
PROFESSOR APPLEMAN: Laura Appleman. Hi. Ellen. I really,
really agree with your comments and I couldn't help thinking about what
Steve Saltzburg said yesterday about the quiet erosion of habeas rights
particularly with this new streamline act. I know you were trying not to
be too expansive and I'm just going to jump in and say, I really see this
as a general systemic trend to nibble away at the rights of all defendants.
Obviously the problem is worse for indigent criminal defendants, but
really there is an erosion of rights for all defendants, and now the secret
evidence. So I guess my question to you is two part, which is what can
we do about it and why do you think this is happening?
PROFESSOR YAROSHEFSKY: The problems are daunting and it
is difficult to find solutions, at least short term ones. As to the reasons
for this slow erosion, politics and judicial appointments play a
significant role. There are issues that are going up now on the use of
9/11 tapes. Many people have argued that the tyranny of small decisions
over several decades have brought us to this current crisis. The
sentencing guidelines shifted the balance in the federal system at least
between prosecutors and judges. The grand jury system is perverted
beyond its original purpose. Executive power-whether by the president
or the DOJ-is the key issue for our time. Will our new Supreme Court
draw lines in a manner that preserves appropriate limits on the exercise
of such power? There is cause for serious concern.
As for the issue of what can be done, we need a conference to
discuss this topic. As a modest beginning, we can start with the first
question that some lawyers ask--one that we discussed during Professor
Ogletree's talk yesterday-that is, whether litigation is an effective
strategy given the significant changes in the composition of the federal
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courts. I am not at all certain about the utility of affirmative litigation,
nor sanguine about the likely results. Nevertheless, there are and will
continue to be some issues where litigation might advance individual
rights and curtail assertions of executive power.
Most of the legal issues will be decided in criminal cases and
frankly, I am not sanguine about the prospect that case law will uphold
defendants' rights and the role of defense counsel. I believe there will be
a steady erosion of such rights. It is important that lawyers move beyond
litigation to preserve our legal system. Education and organizing are
essential. We need to work with high schools and colleges to insure an
understanding about what is at stake. We need to work with
organizations, like the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers which lobbies Congress, drafts legislation, litigates and
provides essential support to defense lawyers. There are many
prosecutors who have expressed their grave concern about recent
developments in the executive branch. We need to forge ties with such
prosecutors. Obviously, there is no simple solution, but a multifaceted
and long term strategy is essential. Unfortunately at this moment, there
is little reason for optimism, but looking backward twenty years from
now, I hope we will see that there were positive developments.
MR. CHARNOV: Bruce Chamov, Hofstra University. On a
personal note, in 1975 while on active duty with the Navy I completed
my doctoral dissertation in clinical organizational psychology. That
dissertation was the product of an investigation of the military and
cultivation of the self and self-concept. Really it asked, what does boot
camp do to you? It contained a sentence in there that said that the United
States Navy boot camps differ little other than in duration and location
from Chinese Communist prison camps. Based on that sentence, my
doctoral dissertation was classified confidential, and twelve years later I
got a post card in the mail that I was now free to publish it if I so
desired.
PROFESSOR YAROSHEFSKY: And did you?
MR. CHARNOV: No, it was too late. I moved on to other things,
among things law school. In fact, this law school.
PROFESSOR YAROSHEFSKY: Yesterday, there was an article on
the front page of the New York Times about information about the
28
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PROFESSOR WOLFRAM: Chuck Wolfram. I enjoyed your talk
very much, and I'm sure I'll enjoy the paper very much. I might have
been the only one, but it struck me that there was somewhat of a large
disconnect between your description of the problem, which seemed to be
a pervasive erosion of the adversary system, and your modest proposals,
which seem to be incrementalist to the extreme. Is that all there is? Is
that all that has to be done to these statutes and their implementation to
correct the problem or are you assuming that they'll be struck down as
unconstitutional?
PROFESSOR YAROSHEFSKY: Thank you for your question. No,
I am certainly not assuming that the statutes will be declared
unconstitutional. And you are correct that my proposals are modest.
Certainly, serious attempts to deal with the overreaching problems
require legislation such as insuring that FISA warrants are available in
the criminal process. One, of course, has to be hesitant about the
legislature. In terms of CIPA, I'm a little more cautious, because I'm
hesitant to return the statute to the legislature to say we need an entirely
new statute for obvious political reasons. I think we can work within the
CIPA statute as it exists so long as judges can understand that these
proceedings should not be ex parte. Once we involve the defense lawyer
in the process and allow the defendant to have access, at least these
modest proposals may provide some measure of restoration of a balance.
PROFESSOR WOLFRAM: I really don't know enough about the
field at all to offer suggestions. I do note this disconnect. I gather you're
saying that largely for strategic political reasons you're keeping your
proposals modest, hoping that those might be adopted since it appears
that the larger proposals would simply be ignored.
PROFESSOR YAROSHEFSKY: Yes, I have kept these proposals
modest in the hope that they are attainable.
MR. TEMPLE: Ralph Temple. It occurs to me, that it would be a
great service if the scholars would collect in one place that was easily
accessible to lawyers litigating these cases, all the instances where
information withheld from the government when finally discovered,
really didn't relate to security, really didn't sustain the government's
position, and just to name one dramatic example that happened about
two years ago, the FISA Court which I think was constructed-I mean, I
don't know the membership and that it's a rubber stamp operation. But
even the FISA Court which for how long has been rubber stamping FBI
applications for warrants exploded in anger, and issued opinions
condemning the FBI for lying to it in seventy-five cases. Now, that is
incredible and, of course, we never read, and I doubt that there's ever
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been any discipline within the FBI against those who committed a form
of perjury who lied in sworn statements to the court. I think that any
time you find yourself in front of a judge, and you're trying to argue
against the secrecy, it would be helpful if you could point to a body of
data that says this stuff, your Honor, when it's brought to light, more
often than not doesn't hold up.
PROFESSOR YAROSHEFSKY: Thank you, Ralph. There are two
centers-at NYU there's a center on law and security that's trying to
gather such data. Also, lawyers around the country as part of the
National Association and Criminal Defense Lawyers Group gather such
data. The overriding problem in such a process is what I mentionedmost of the information is secret.
PROFESSOR SIMON: Thank you very much. [Applause]

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol34/iss3/14

30

